Medical Malpractice Issues Related to the Use of Telemedicine - An Analysis of the Ways in Which Telecommunications Affect the Principles of Medical Malpractice by Granade, Phyllis Forrester
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 73 Number 1 Article 4 
1997 
Medical Malpractice Issues Related to the Use of Telemedicine - 
An Analysis of the Ways in Which Telecommunications Affect the 
Principles of Medical Malpractice 
Phyllis Forrester Granade 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Granade, Phyllis Forrester (1997) "Medical Malpractice Issues Related to the Use of Telemedicine - An 
Analysis of the Ways in Which Telecommunications Affect the Principles of Medical Malpractice," North 
Dakota Law Review: Vol. 73 : No. 1 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol73/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ISSUES RELATED TO THE USE
OF TELEMEDICINE-AN ANALYSIS OF THE WAYS
IN WHICH TELECOMMUNICATIONS AFFECTS
THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
PHYLLIS FORRESTER GRANADE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Telemedicine is changing the face of health care delivery, and its
rapid growth is raising questions regarding the application of traditional
legal principles to this new delivery system. Telemedicine combines
traditional medical care with the efficiency of current telecommunica-
tions technology in order to deliver health care nationally and interna-
tionally. At its most fundamental level, telemedicine may be described
as the use of telecommunications to deliver health care information and
services. Delivery of information or services may be accomplished over
the Internet, via a telecommunications line (copper wire or fiber optic),
or by way of satellite transmission. Services provided by telemedicine
include, but are by no means limited to, interactive video consultations,
the transmission of radiographic and pathological images (teleradiology
and telepathology), and telemetry. A short list of the types of health
care information provided via telecommunications includes Internet
reference materials, computerized patient records, and the electronic
filing of medical claims. Providers involved with "traditional" tele-
medicine-interactive video consultations, teleradiology and telepathol-
ogy-are concerned with medical malpractice claims, and how the use of
telemedicine may affect their liability. However, every provider deliver-
ing services via telecommunications, whether via electronic mail or
interactive video, should review the ways in which traditional medical
malpractice principles will be applied to telemedicine.
II. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE-A GENERAL DISCUSSION
Telemedical malpractice cannot be discussed without first reviewing
traditional medical malpractice. The word "malpractice" describes a
breach of the duty owed by someone rendering professional services to a
person who has contracted for such services. I A plaintiff in a medical
malpractice action must establish the following elements: (1) a duty by
* Phyllis Forrester Granade is a health care attorney with the Atlanta Office of Kilpatrick
Stockton LLP. She was formerly a legal consultant to the Medical College of Georgia Telemedicine
Center and has researched the issues of malpractice, licensure, credentialing, and privacy as these
issues relate to telemedicine.
1. Weaver v. University of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 506 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
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the physician to act according to certain standards; (2) a breach of the
applicable standard of care; (3) an injury to the patient; and (4) a causal
connection between the breach of care and the patient's injury.2 There-
fore, medical malpractice has occurred if a physician owes the patient a
duty of due care, fails to meet the standard of care established by the
profession and pertinent case law, and negligently injures the patient.3 It
is a basic principle of tort law that no cause of action for negligence
exists unless the defendant owes a legal duty to the plaintiff.4 Whether a
duty to the patient exists is a question of law that must be decided before
the issue of the standard of care arises. 5 If a physician-patient relation-
ship exists, then the physician has a duty to exercise that reasonable
degree of learning and skill ordinarily possessed and used by members
of his or her profession.6
The Texas Supreme Court generally discussed medical malpractice,
as well as the duty which arises from a physician-patient relationship, in
St. John v. Pope:7
The standard of care demanded in medical malpractice cases
requires skills not ordinarily possessed by lay persons. Medi-
cal malpractice differs from ordinary negligence in the circum-
stances under which a duty arises. Generally the duty to
refrain from negligently injuring others requires no prior
relationship. For example, a motorist owes to complete strang-
ers the duty to stop at traffic signals. By contrast, professionals
do not owe a duty to exercise their particular talents, knowl-
edge, and skill on behalf of every person they encounter in the
course of the day. As is true of all callings, physicians are not
obligated to practice their profession or render services to
everyone who asks. It is only with a physician's consent,
whether express or implied, that the doctor-patient relationship
comes into being. Thus we agree with those cases that hold
that the duty to treat the patient with proper professional skill
flows from the consensual relationship between the patient and
physician, and only when that relationship exists can there be
a breach of a duty resulting in medical malpractice.8
2. Ortiz v. Shah, 905 S.W.2d 609, 610 (Tex. App. 1995).
3. Id.
4. Weaver, 506 N.W.2d at 266.
5. St. John v. Pope, 901 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Tex. 1995); King v. Fisher, 918 S.W.2d 108, 112 (Tex.
App. 1996).
6. Dodd-Anderson v. Stevens, 905 F. Supp. 937, 945 (D. Kan. 1995).
7. 901 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1995).
8. St. John, 901 S.W.2d at 423 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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As emphasized in St. John, the physician-patient relationship affects
the potential liability of the physician. As the use of telemedicine grows,
the definition of a physician-patient relationship will begin to reflect the
changed delivery system. Whether a physician-patient relationship
exists, and if so, the determination of when it began, will play an
increasingly key role in telemedical malpractice cases. As the
determination of the relationship takes on increased importance,
however, the courts will find that the increased efficiencies of this new
health care delivery system may cause a blurring of the lines between
those actions which previously never formed a physician-patient
relationship and those actions which did. The criteria used to establish a
physician-patient relationship in a telemedical context must become well
honed in order to correctly apportion liability for negligent medical
care.
The elements of medical malpractice are long-established funda-
mentals of tort law; however, the manner in which these principles will be
applied to long distance health care raises important questions. A physi-
cian or other health care provider diagnosing or treating a patient via
telecommunications is confronted with the following questions: (1) is a
provider-patient relationship established during a telemedical consulta-
tion; (2) what is the appropriate standard of care for telemedicine; (3)
may a patient claim "abandonment" once the telemedical connection is
ended, or in the alternative, does the provider have a continued duty to
the patient after the consultation; (4) may a physician be guilty of negli-
gently supervising other providers via telemedicine; (5) what is the
provider's liability for a missed diagnosis due to technological (rather
than human) error; (6) what injuries might a patient suffer (or claim to
suffer) which would stem from long-distance health care; and (7) might
providers be guilty of negligence for not availing themselves of the
specialized care available via telemedicine. Additionally, since telecom-
munications allows medicine to be quickly and efficiently practiced
across state boundaries, jurisdictional issues confront the practitioner
who must determine where he or she is practicing medicine and,
correspondingly, where he or she may be sued.
Currently, legal precedent cannot provide clear answers to many of
these questions, since to date no medical malpractice cases involving
telemedicine have been decided by the courts. However, several recent
cases involving teleradiology have been settled prior to trial, and it
appears likely that within the next two years courts in some jurisdictions
will address the practice of medicine via telecommunications. For the
time being, a review of related case law provides at least a preliminary
1997]
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guide to the ways in which the courts may answer these questions in the
coming years.
III. THE PHYSICIAN PATIENT RELATIONSHIP: IS IT FORMED
DURING A TELEMEDICAL CONSULTATION?
Regardless of whether a malpractice action involves telemedicine, in
order for a suit to be brought a physician-patient relationship must first
be established between the parties. 9 A plaintiff in a medical malpractice
action must prove that the patient and the physician entered into a
contractual relationship.' 0 The contract to provide services to the patient
may be written or implied, but it must exist in order for the physician to
owe a legal duty to the patient.'' If the contract exists, then a
physician-patient relationship exists and the physician owes a resulting
duty of due care toward the patient. 12 The contract is generally consen-
sual in nature; in other words, a physician-patient relationship exists
where a patient knowingly seeks the assistance of a physician and the
physician knowingly accepts the patient.13 As one court has stated, "the
relationship is created when professional services are rendered and
accepted for purposes of medical treatment."14 Courts emphasize the
necessity of the relationship's existence in order for a plaintiff to bring a
malpractice action.1 5 In the absence of an agreement between the
physician and the patient (or someone acting on the patient's behalf)16
to provide services there is no relationship, and without a relationship, a
malpractice claim may not be brought.
As mentioned above, there have been very few medical malpractice
suits involving telemedicine, and all have been settled prior to trial.
Since no case law involving telemedicine currently exists to provide a
guide for determining the existence of the physician-patient relationship,
9. See Weaver, 506 N.W.2d at 266; Miller v. Sullivan, 625 N.Y.S.2d 102, 103 (App. Div. 1995);
Ortiz v. Shah, 905 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Tex. App. 1995); Wheeler v. Yettie Kersting Mem'l Hosp., 866
S.W.2d 32, 38 (Tex. App. 1993).
10. Ortiz, 905 S.W.2d at 611.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. James L. Rigelhaupt, Annotation, What Constitutes Physician-Patient Relationship for
Malpractice Purposes, 17 A.L.R.4th 132, 137 (1982) (citing Oliver v. Brock, 342 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 1976)
and Payne v. Sherrer, 458 S.E.2d 916 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)).
14. Miller, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 103-04 (citations omitted).
15. See Roberts v. Hunter, 426 S.E.2d 797, 799 (SC. 1993) (establishing a physician-patient
relationship prerequisite to claims of medical malpractice); Lopez v. Aziz, 852 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex.
App. 1993) (holding that the essence of a medical malpractice action is the existence of a duty
stemming from physician-patient relationship).
16. See Walters v. Rinker, 520 N.E.2d 468, 471 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that a pathologist
established a physician-patient relationship by rendering reports on biopsies submitted by another
physician for the pathologist's review); Dougherty v. Gifford, 826 S.W.2d 668, 674 (Tex. App. 1992)
(finding that a pathologist established a physician-patient relationship by giving a report on a biopsy
that had been given to him by another physician for review).
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those cases which generally discuss the liability of physician consultants
must be analyzed. It remains commonplace for a physician to consult
with a distant physician about a patient's diagnosis or treatment via tele-
phone. Typically, no physician-patient relationship develops between
the patient and the consultant if the consultant informally offers his or
her opinion to another physician regarding an anonymous patient's
medical care, and he or she renders such consultative opinion without
charge. Once the consultant's opinion becomes more formal, the
question of liability becomes more complex.
Physicians frequently speak with a patient directly over the phone
regarding diagnosis or treatment. Case law has established that if the
physician offers diagnostic or treatment advice to the patient via the
telephone, then the physician has established a relationship with the pa-
tient. 17 However, neither of the consultations described above is directly
analogous to a telemedical video consult. During an interactive video
consultation, a consultant typically reviews the patient's record (or the
significant portions thereof), examines and speaks with the patient, offers
advice to both the patient and the local physician, and may accept a fee
for his or her services. While the telemedical consultant is likely to be
more informed regarding the patient's condition via a video consultation
than during a telephone call, he or she will generally not be the sole
physician responsible for diagnosing the patient. For telemedical
consultations, control over the patient's diagnosis and course of treat-
ment may become a key element in establishing liability.
The key questions a court asks in order to determine whether a
physician-patient relationship is formed in a consultative situation are as
follows: (1) whether the consultant and the patient have met; (2) whether
the consultant ever examined the patient; 18 (3) whether the patient's
records were ever viewed by the consultant; (4) whether the consulting
physician knew the patient's name; and (5) whether the consultation was
gratuitous or for a fee. 19 Importantly, only a few of these elements must
be met to establish a relationship. Generally, when a consultation is
between physicians, and a specific patient is not identified, the consulting
physician does not establish a physician-patient relationship. 20 This may
change dramatically in a telemedical context, since the telemedicine
17. Bienz v. Central Suffolk Hosp., 557 N.Y.S.2d 139, 139-40 (App. Div. 1990).
18. Traditionally, the examination of a patient has only occurred in a face-to-face consultation;
however, there is no reason to assume that an interactive video consultation or even the examination
of still pictures by a consultant would not be considered an examination of the patient for purposes of a
physician-patient relationship.
19. Clarke v. Hock, 219 Cal. Rptr. 845, 851-52 (Ct. App. 1985).
20. See Roberts, 426 S.E.2d at 799 (showing a case analysis of situations where the physician
gave advice to another physician and there was no physician-patient relationship found).
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consultant is much more likely to have reviewed the patient's record and
to have examined the patient.
The importance of examining the patient and reviewing the pa-
tient's record in order to create a physician-patient relationship was
discussed in Roberts v. Hunter.2 1 The Roberts court held that no
physician-patient relationship developed where a neurologist was called
to consult in an emergency room but the patient left before the
physician arrived.22 The court found that although the neurologist
agreed to examine the patient, the fact that the exam never occurred
prevented the formation of the relationship. 23
In St. John v. Pope, the issue was whether the on-call physician,
consulted via the telephone by an emergency room physician, formed a
physician-patient relationship by expressing his opinion that the patient
could be transferred to another hospital, and if no relationship was
formed, whether the physician owed duties outside of such a
relationship. 24 The on-call physician obtained information regarding
the patient's condition from the emergency room physician, and using
that information, the on-call physician erroneously determined that the
patient was suffering from back trauma rather than meningitis. 25 After
the on-call physician determined that the patient could be transferred to
another facility which specialized in neurology, the patient left the
hospital and suffered permanent disabilities from the meningitis.26 The
court held that "a physician may decline treatment and thereby decline
to create a physician-patient relationship, even on the basis of an errone-
ous conclusion that the patient's condition is beyond his or her ability to
treat." 27 In this case, no physician-patient relationship was found;
however, the court did note that "[t]he fact that a physician does not
deal directly with a patient does not necessarily preclude the existence of
a physician-patient relationship." 28 Although a physician may not
review a patient's record or examine a patient, the physician might still
be liable for incorrect advice rendered to another provider on behalf of a
specific patient if that patient suffers harm due to the advice.29 However,
the plaintiff must first establish the existence of a physician-patient
relationship.
21. 426 S.E.2d 797 (S.C. 1993).
22. Roberts, 426 S.E.2d at 799.
23. Id. at 798.
24. St. John v. Pope, 901 S.W.2d 420, 421 (Tex. 1995).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 421-22.
27. Id. at 423.
28. Id. at 424.
29. See Wheeler v. Yettie Kersting Mem'l Hosp., 866 S.W.2d 32, 40 (Tex. App. 1993) (stating
that a doctor's approval of transferring a patient was enough to create a physician-patient
relationship).
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The Texas Court of Appeals was asked to review whether a physi-
cian-patient relationship had been created in Lopez v. Aziz,30 a case in
which a consulting obstetrician spoke by telephone with the patient's
regular physician. 31 The court placed great emphasis on the fact that the
patient was never contacted or examined by the consultant, and that the
patient's chart had never been reviewed. 32 The court made the following
statement, which continues to be cited by courts in other jurisdictions: 33
To expose physicians ... to liability for simply conferring with
a colleague would be detrimental in the long run to those
seeking competent medical attention and is contrary to the
public policy of this state. [Defendant] did not contact, exam-
ine, or treat Mrs. Lopez, nor was Mrs. Lopez referred to him
for any treatment or consultation. [Defendant's] opinions
regarding the proper course of treatment were addressed to
[Mrs. Lopez's regular physician]. [The physician] as Mrs.
Lopez's treating physician was free to accept or reject those
opinions as he saw fit.34
This comment by the court may offer at least a partial liability shield for
telemedicine practitioners, who may argue that the patient's referring
(and presumably local) physician retains control over and responsibility
for the continuing treatment of the patient.
In another Texas case, Wheeler v. Yettie Kersting Memorial Hospi-
tal,35 the court found that a physician-patient relationship was created
when an on-call physician received information via the telephone from a
nurse at the hospital regarding the status of a woman in labor, and the
on-call physician used the information to determine that the patient
could be sent to a hospital over ninety miles away. 36 Less than an hour
in route, the patient began delivering a breech position baby which died
when her cervix clamped shut around the child's neck and suffocated
the child.37 According to the court, the on-call physician established a
physician-patient relationship with the patient because he evaluated the
status of the patient's labor and gave the approval for the patient's
transfer, even though the he had no contact or connection with the
30. 852 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. App. 1993).
31. Lopez v. Aziz, 852 S.W.2d 303, 304 (Tex. App. 1993).
32. Id. at 305.
33. See Rivera v. Prince George's County Health Dep't, 649 A.2d 1212, 1229 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1994) (citing the Lopez statement found in the text).
34. Lopez, 852 S.W.2d at 307.
35. 866 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. App. 1993).
36. Wheeler v. Yettie Kersting Mem'l Hosp., 866 S.W.2d 32, 35 (Tex. App. 1993).
37. Id. at 36.
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patient other than one phone call from the nurse (which the patient was
unaware of at the time).38 The court stated:
We conclude that in evaluating the status of Mrs. Wheeler's
labor and giving his approval, he established a doctor-patient
relationship with Mrs. Wheeler and accepted the duties which
flow from such a relationship, specifically the duty to comply
with the applicable standard of care for a physician in an
on-call capacity at a rural hospital in transferring an obstetrical
patient to a distant facility. 39
The court continued in a footnote, saying:
It is axiomatic that a doctor-patient relationship may arise
from, briefly exist, and be limited by the unique circumstances
presented in a transfer situation. Otherwise, a hospital's require-
ment for physician approval of patient transfers would require
the patient to subject herself to the physician's medical
decision . . . without imposing an obligation on the physician
to make that decision in a responsible manner.40
The facts of Wheeler involve the transfer of patient information via
telecommunications. Clearly, a physician-patient relationship may be
established even without the face-to-face consultation of an interactive
video examination, or indeed without even the patient's immediate
knowledge. A physician who attempts to evaluate, diagnose, or treat a
patient may be forming a physician-patient relationship, although this
relationship will in all likelihood be limited to the unique circumstances
under which the physician was consulted. The practitioner using tele-
medicine in any of its forms should be certain to obtain as much infor-
mation regarding the patient and his or her condition as is necessary to
make a professional judgment concerning the patient's diagnosis and
the appropriate course of treatment. A partially informed decision can
have devastating repercussions for the patient as well as the physician,
and the easy use of electronic mail, image transmission, and video
consultation should not lull a doctor into making professional decisions
based on less information than he or she would require for a face-to-face
encounter.
The patient's failure to follow the physician's advice may prevent
the formation of a physician-patient relationship. In Miller v. Sullivan,41
a prospective patient was suffering from the symptoms of a heart attack
when he called a physician, who advised the prospective patient to
38. Id. at 39.
39. Id. at 40.
40. Id. at 40 n.6.
41. 625 N.Y.S.2d 102 (App. Div. 1995).
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immediately come to the doctor's office. 42 The prospective patient, a
dentist, did not follow the physician's advice but instead continued to see
his own patients until mid-day, when he went to the physician's office
and suffered a fatal heart attack in the waiting room.43 The court held
that a telephone call advising a prospective patient as to a course of
treatment could, constitute professional advice for the purpose of creat-
ing a physician-patient relationship only when the advice, if incorrect,
would be actionable. 44 In Miller, the advice of the physician over the
phone was correct, but the prospective patient did not follow it. 45 Since
the prospective patient refused the recommended course of treatment, no
consensual contract for professional services was formed between the
parties and no physician-patient relationship was established.4 6 There-
fore, if a physician renders an opinion as to a diagnosis and course of
treatment which is correct, but the patient fails to follow the physician's
recommendation, the physician may argue that the patient never accept-
ed the physician's professional services and therefore no relationship
was formed.
In general, if no advice is given to a prospective patient, then no
physician-patient relationship is formed. The court in Weaver v. Univer-
sity of Michigan Board of Regents 47 held that a telephone call to sched-
ule an appointment with a physician did not establish a physician-patient
relationship where the caller had no on-going relationship with the
physician, and where the caller did not receive medical advice during the
conversation. 48 Presumably, a physician who interacts with a prospective
patient will not form a physician-patient relationship with the prospective
patient if he or she (1) has no pre-existing relationship with the person
which would otherwise require the physician to act, and (2) does not off-
er professional assistance to the person. 49 This fact pattern would most
likely occur in a telemedicine situation when a physician is consulted
regarding a prospective patient and realizes that the illness is beyond his
or her training or skill, and the consultant refuses to offer any advice
other than to refer the ailing person elsewhere for treatment.
However, in Bienz v. Central Suffolk Hospital,50 the court held that
the question of whether a phone call to schedule an appointment
established a physician-patient relationship was sufficient to withstand
42. Miller v. Sullivan, 625 N.Y.S.2d 102, 103 (App. Div. 1995).
43. Id. at 104.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 506 N.W.2d 264 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
48. Weaver v. University of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 506 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
49. See id.
50. 557 N.Y.S.2d 139 (App. Div. 1990).
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the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, since it was
unclear what medical advice was offered over the phone by the physician
to the potential patient. 5 1 The court stated that advice pertaining to
course of treatment could be the basis for a physician-patient
relationship and malpractice liability, and concluded that "[w]hether the
physician's giving of advice furnishes a sufficient basis upon which to
conclude that an implied physician-patient relationship had arisen is
ordinarily a question of fact for the jury." 52 The plaintiff in a medical
malpractice action might avoid the results in Weaver if he or she raises
the issue of whether the physician offered professional advice during a
phone call or other telemedical interaction, and shows that the patient
relied upon the advice to his or her detriment. The physician should be
certain to document all interaction with the patient. Telemedicine in
many instances may alleviate this difficulty, since many encounters are
recorded electronically.
IV. THE STANDARD OF CARE
If a physician-patient relationship exists, the next issue to be
addressed is whether the physician met the applicable standard of care
while treating the patient.53 The court must determine whether the
physician met the requisite level of skill and knowledge according to the
standard of care applied in that jurisdiction. 54
Throughout the United States, a plaintiff in a medical malpractice
action must ordinarily establish the physician's negligence through
expert testimony as to the standard of care and the proper medical
treatment.55 In Bell v. Hart,56 the court stated that "medical testimony"
means testimony by physicians or properly introduced medical treatises
that are recognized as authoritative and standard.57 The only exception
which exists to the requirement of expert testimony in order to prove the
standard of care for any given procedure is when the breach of the
standard is obvious to the average layperson. 58
The national standard and the community standard are the two
generally accepted standards for determining a physician's negligence. 59
51. Bienz v. Central Suffolk Hosp., 557 N.Y.S.2d 139, 139-40 (App. Div. 1990).
52. Id. at 139-40.
53. Dodd-Anderson v. Stevens, 905 F. Supp. 937, 945 (D. Kan. 1995).
54. Id. at 945 n.8.
55. See Bell v. Hart, 516 So. 2d 562, 566 (Ala. 1987) (holding that generally plaintiff must offer
expert testimony as to proper medical procedure); Dine v. Williams, 830 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1992) (stating that evidence of the standard of care must be introduced by experts).
56. 516 So. 2d 562 (Ala. 1987).
57. Bell, 516 So. 2d at 566.
58. Pruitt v. Zeiger, 590 So. 2d 236, 237-38 (Ala. 1991).
59. Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Standard of Care Owed to Patient by Medical Specialist as
Determined by Local, "Like Community," State, National or Other Standards, 18 A.L.R.4th 603,
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The community standard requires that a physician exercise the same de-
gree of care ordinarily exercised by other doctors in the same or a simi-
lar community. 60 The national standard holds physicians throughout the
nation, and within the same specialty, responsible for a similar base of
knowledge and professional skill.61 Using the national standard, a pedia-
trician in a rural location would be expected to be as knowledgeable and
skilled as a pediatrician in an urban location. 62 Some states have codi-
fied which standard of care shall be applied in a malpractice action. For
example, Alabama's standard of care for medical malpractice purposes
is defined as the following:
In performing professional services for a patient, a physician's,
surgeon's, or dentist's duty to the patient shall be to exercise
such reasonable care, diligence and skill as physicians, sur-
geons, and dentists in the same general neighborhood, and in
the same general line of practice, ordinarily have and exercise
in a like case.63
The courts in Alabama adhere to a same general neighborhood rule
regarding the standard of care rather than a strict locality rule, which
would limit the standard of care to that exercised by physicians in the
same geographical locality or community who are engaged in the same
type of practice. 64
Some jurisdictions prefer a national standard, stating that
distinctions based on geography are no longer valid in light of modem
transportation, communication, and medical education, all of which
promote standardization of care.65 The application of a national stan-
dard to nationally certified board certified specialists is fairly common. 66
In Robbins v. Footer,67 the court held that a nationally certified specialist
should be held to a national standard of care considering the omni-
present nature of telecommunications, the ready availability of current
scientific information through professional journals, and the stan-
dardized nature of educational and residency requirements in order for a
practitioner to become a board certified specialist. 68 Considering that
608-19 (1982) (noting that the community standard may be applied in two different manners, such that
a physician's actions may be compared to those of physicians in similar communities or to those
physicians in his or her locality, that is, the same community).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 606-08.
62. Id.
63. ALA. CODE § 6-5-484(a) (1993).
64. Zills v. Brown, 382 So. 2d 528, 532 (Ala. 1980).
65. Zitter, supra note 59, at 614 (citing Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1968)).
66. Id. at 616-18 (citing Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Brune v. Belinkoff, 235
N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1968); Roberts v. Tardif, 417 A.2d 444 (Me. 1980)).
67. 553 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
68. Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123, 128-29 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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many specialists currently participating in telemedicine consultations are
nationally certified, the trend toward holding these practitioners to a
national standard is likely to continue.
V. THE ISSUE OF CONTROL-WHERE DOES RESPONSIBILITY
REST FOR DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT DECISIONS
OCCURRING VIA TELEMEDICINE?
A. WILL PHYSICIANS BE INDEPENDENTLY, OR JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY
LIABLE?
What would appear at first blush to merit a simple answer is in
actuality a very complex issue. Depending upon the type of treatment
performed and the jurisdiction in which it occurs, physicians treating a
patient for the same illness may be jointly and severally liable for
malpractice damages. Physicians have been held jointly and severally
liable for malpractice in the absence of evidence separating the physi-
cians' individual acts of negligence in causing the injury, even if their
actions did not coincide. 69 Some jurisdictions have recognized that
where the independent acts of multiple physicians supplement one
another and contribute to an indivisible injury, the physicians are consid-
ered to be joint tortfeasors. 70 However, other courts hold that where the
actions of physicians are separate and independent of one another,
neither individual physician will be liable for the plaintiff's entire
damages. 7 1 In other words, each physician may only be liable for the
damage caused by his or her own actions if those actions in causing the
harm are distinguishable from the actions of the other involved
physicians.
Case law for the past fifteen years evidences a trend toward allowing
joint and several liability against independently treating physicians when
the injury suffered by the plaintiff is not clearly divisible in terms. of
which physician caused the harm. 72 Stated more clearly, if it cannot be
shown which physician is responsible for the patient's injury, it is highly
likely that the court will find those physicians involved with the treatment
of the patient's illness to be jointly and severally liable. 73
69. Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Joint and Several Liability of Physicians Whose Independent
Negligence in Treatment of Patient Causes Indivisible Injury, 9 A.L.R.5th 746, 758 (1993).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Ravo v. Rogatnick, 514 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (N.Y. 1987) (holding a pediatrician
jointly and severally liable with an obstetrician for injuries negligently inflicted on a child, resulting in
brain damage that rendered her severely and permanently retarded). Although treatment by the
physicians was not concurrent, the responsibility for the injury was not divisible. Id.
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During a typical telemedical interactive video consultation, the
patient's local physician is involved during the consult and remains in
control of the patient's treatment after the consultation with the distant
specialist concludes. This scenario is a departure from traditional
referral patterns in which a referring physician actually transfers a
patient to a'specialist for continued care. With a traditional referral, a
patient travels to the consultant's office and responsibility for diagnosis
and continued treatment lies with the consultant unless the patient is
specifically referred back to the referring physician for continued care.
A telemedicine consultation leaves the patient in the referring physi-
cian's care with a resulting responsibility on the part of the referring
physician to continue the patient's treatment. The referring physician is
not bound to abide by the advice rendered by the consultant via telemedi-
cine, but may weigh the additional information provided by the specialist
and choose another diagnosis or course of treatment.
These new patterns raise provoking questions related to the
responsibility and liability of physicians involved in telemedicine
consultations. It is not uncommon to hear a specialist participating in a
telemedical encounter claim that the involvement of the referring
physician prevents the specialist from establishing a physician-patient
relationship with the patient. A question arises as to whether the
proximity of the local physician and his or her continuing treatment of
the patient prevents privity between the distant consultant and the patient.
In all probability, the interaction between the consultant and the patient
forms a physician-patient relationship. Even so, it remains to be seen
how liability will be shared between the consulting and referring
physician. A final question is whether the lack of control over the
patient's continued treatment will protect the consultant.
B. WHAT IS A PHYSICIAN'S LIABILITY FOR SUPERVISING ANOTHER
PHYSICIAN VIA TELEMEDICINE?
A review of case law shows that the practitioner using telemedicine
in a supervisory capacity is not analogous to a proctor. A proctor is a
credentialed physician who has been asked by his or her hospital to
observe another physician who is attempting to become credentialed. 74
Traditionally, a proctor is not liable for malpractice which occurs while
supervising a physician who is attempting to gain his or her credentials
because the proctor is only overseeing the practice of medicine and is
not actually performing the diagnosis, treatment, or surgery. 75 The
74. Phyllis F. Granade & Jay H. Sanders, Implementing Telemedicine Nationwide: Analyzing the
Legal Issues, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 67, 70 (1996) (citing Clarke v. Hock, 219 Cal. Rptr. 845, 848 (Ct. App.
1985)).
75. Clarke v. Hock, 219 Cal. Rptr. 845, 851 (Ct. App. 1985).
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comparison has been made that a practitioner using telecommunications
to supervise another physician is merely a proctor overseeing the treat-
ment of the patient, and therefore cannot be held responsible for the
outcome of the treatment. Although no cases have directly dealt with
this issue as it applies to telemedicine, several have generally discussed
the difference between consulting with another physician and
proctoring.
Clarke v. Hoek76 involved a physician acting as proctor over a sur-
geon who was attempting to gain credentials at the proctor's hospital. 77
The court found that the proctor did not have a physician-patient
relationship with the patient, and therefore had no duty to the patient to
prevent malpractice from occurring. 78 The court identified the follow-
ing key factors for determining when a physician-patient relationship
exists: (1) whether the consultant and the patient have met; (2) whether
the consultant ever examined the patient; (3) whether the patient's
records were ever viewed by the consultant; (4) whether the consulting
physician knew the patient's name; and (5) whether the consultation was
gratuitous or for a fee.79 Prior to the surgery, the proctor in Clarke
reviewed the patient's X-rays and discussed with the other physician his
operating plans.80  However, the proctor did not participate in the
surgery (in fact, he remained outside the sterile field throughout the
procedure), he received no payment as proctor, and he never met the
patient either before or after the surgery.8 1 According to the court, the
proctor's sole duty was to act in an observational manner and screen the
surgeon on behalf of the hospital.8 2
The Clarke court stated that the physician acted as a proctor for the
sole purpose of credentialing qualified physicians at his hospital, and
that he only did so because the hospital required it of him.8 3 Therefore,
there could be no voluntary undertaking on the part of the proctor
which would give rise to a legal duty toward the patient.84 The court
stated that the proctor "did not undertake to intervene in, supervise, or
control the operations." 85 The impact of this statement on telemedicine
is significant.
The premise of telemedicine is that a physician may be consulted
and his or her specialized knowledge be immediately used to benefit the
76. 219 Cal. Rptr. 845 (Ct. App. 1985).
77. Clarke, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
78. Id. at 851.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 848.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 852.
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patient. The role of the physician consulted via telemedicine is to offer
advice to the patient (or the referring physician) and to intervene in the
patient's diagnosis and treatment. If the consult involves interactive
video, the physician may directly interact with the patient or may directly
supervise and assist the referring physician in the proper treatment of the
patient. The consultant might also be reimbursed for his or her assist-
ance. This interaction goes beyond the scope of proctoring; with tele-
medicine, the physician actively participates in the encounter and will
typically form a physician-patient relationship with the patient.
A case from 1950, Morrill v. Komasinski,86 also has interesting
implications for telemedical practice. In Morrill, the court held two
physicians jointly and severally liable for damages for the incorrect
treatment of a broken arm. 87 One of the physicians in Morrill contended
that following his alleged misdiagnosis, the entire responsibility for the
patient was assumed by the second physician. 88 The court held that the
first physician, a family physician, participated in the diagnosis of the
patient and remained in active charge of the patient, even after a cast was
applied to the patient's arm by the second physician. 89 The court noted
that both physicians allegedly failed to diagnose a hairline fracture that
needed additional treatment. 90 Furthermore, the court noted the physi-
cians' continued failure to meet the standard course of treatment (they
did not take additional X-rays to determine how the patient was
healing). 91 According to the court, the physicians' liability was joint.92
Another way to describe the difference between proctoring and
consulting is to review the legal theories of nonfeasance and malfea-
sance. It is a principle of tort law that no one has a duty to act to protect
any other person, unless a relationship exists between those individuals
establishing a duty to act.93 In medical malpractice, a physician has no
duty to act to protect a patient absent a physician-patient relationship. If
a surgeon malpractices while being observed by a proctor, and the
proctor does not attempt to prevent the surgeon's actions, this constitutes
nonfeasance by the proctor, and liability does not result. 94 As the court
in Clarke noted, absent a physician-patient relationship, no duty to assist
or protect exists, and as a corollary, no duty to control third parties exists
86. 41 N.W.2d 620 (Wis. 1950).
87. Morrill v. Komasinski, 41 N.W.2d 620, 624 (Wis. 1950).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Clarke v. Hoeck, 219 Cal. Rptr. 845, 852 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that when a person
who has not created a risk does not act to protect someone there is no liability for failure to act).
94. Granade & Sanders, supra note 74, at 70.
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without a special relationship. 95 It follows that a physician could
certainly act as a teleproctor (e.g., credentialing other physicians) and
not establish a physician-patient relationship.
However, if a physician participates in telemedicine, and assists in
the diagnosis or treatment of a patient, then in all probability the
physician will establish a physician-patient relationship and a resulting
duty to use the professional skill and knowledge expected in such a
situation. In Greenberg v. Perkins,96 the court held that even when a
traditional physician-patient relationship does not exist, a physician who
undertakes to examine a non-patient owes a duty to conduct the exam in
a manner which will not cause harm to the person being examined. 97 If
a physician's actions harm a patient, or if a physician fails to act and had
a duty to do so, then malfeasance has occurred and the physician may be
liable for damages. 98
Which physician has ultimate authority over and responsibility for
the diagnosis and treatment of a patient is of utmost importance in
telemedicine. Clarke does not specifically address the issue of control
over the patient's diagnosis and treatment. The court made it apparent
that control over the patient's surgery rested in the hands of the surgeon,
not the proctor; therefore, the division of potential liability was not
discussed. 99 The use of telecommunications to access health care ser-
vices from one or more providers raises the issue of who is responsible if
malpractice occurs. The question of ultimate responsibility for patient
care has already been addressed by statute in California, where the Tele-
medicine Development Act of 1996 prevents out-of-state consultants
(those not licensed in California) from having "ultimate authority over
the care or primary diagnosis of a patient" located in California.100
Although this was a reform of the licensing law, it has implications for
malpractice liability.
The most commonplace occurrence of telemedicine is for a special-
ized health care provider to make his or her services available to assist
other physicians in their diagnostic or treatment decisions, thereby avoid-
ing missed diagnoses and incorrect treatment plans. In this manner, tele-
medicine has vast potential for reducing the numbers of malpractice
suits, and for increasing the effectiveness of health care delivery. How-
ever, for those malpractice suits which do arise involving a specialized
95. Clarke, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
96. 845 P.2d 530 (Colo. 1993).
97. Greenberg v. Perkins, 845 P.2d 530, 538 (Colo. 1993).
98. Id.
99. Clarke, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 850.
100. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2060 (West Supp. 1996).
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consultant offering advice to another physician, the consultant must
realize the responsibility-and potential liability-for his or her advice.
In Baker v. Story,'Ol a neurosurgeon was supervising (not proctor-
ing) a resident when the resident severed the patient's ureter rather than
the intended neural ganglia.102 The plaintiff claimed that the neuro-
surgeon delegated the surgery to the less skilled physician, failed to
personally perform the surgery, failed to properly supervise the resident,
failed to distinguish between the ureter and the nerve ganglia for the
resident when asked, and incorrectly directed the resident to cut the
ureter. 103 While the resident was not found guilty of malpractice in a
separate case, the court in Baker stated that it was clear that the alleged
acts of personal negligence by the consulting specialist were his own
separate acts and that his alleged liability was based on his own negligent
conduct, rather than any theory of liability for the resident's acts. 104
The facts of Baker are analogous to many telemedicine consulta-
tions in which a consulting physician supervises surgery or other treat-
ment within his or her field of specialty which is being performed by a
less experienced physician in a distant locale. While the involvement of
a specialist may lower the risk of a malpractice action against the local
physician, the risk to the distant specialist might increase due to his or
her involvement in telemedical procedures. Another twist to the
potential liability issues raised by Baker is whether the consulting
specialist, if he or she feels the treatment is beyond the skill of the local
physician, has a responsibility to inform the patient or to insist upon the
patient's transfer.
The Clarke elements are important in determining when a physi-
cian-patient relationship is established during interactive consultations,
but a relationship may be established by other means as well. The court
in Dougherty v. Giffordl0 5 held that a physician-patient relationship
existed between a pathologist and a patient whose biopsy was incorrectly
interpreted as malignant.1 06 The pathologist never met the patient and
never reviewed the patient's records.107 Instead, the court found that a
physician-patient relationship was created by the acceptance of the
pathology work, the conduction of the tests, the preparation of a lab
report, and the acceptance of a fee for the services rendered.108 The
101. 621 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. App. 1981).
102. Baker v. Story, 621 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Tex. App. 1981).
103. Id. at 642.
104. Id.
105. 826 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. App. 1992).
106. Dougherty v. Gifford, 826 S.W.2d 668, 674 (Tex. App. 1992).
107. Id.
108. Id.
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court stated that there could be no doubt that the diagnostic services were
furnished on behalf of the patient.109
Other courts have found physician-patient relationships between
pathologists and patients. In Walters v. Rinker,110 the patient's family
physician referred the patient to a doctor who removed a suspicious
lump from the patient's thigh and sent it to the defendant, a pathologist,
for examination.111 The pathologist stated that no malignancy existed,
but several years later the patient was diagnosed with cancer. 112 The
pathologist contended that no physician-patient relationship was formed
with the patient, based on the following two grounds: (1) he did not
examine or treat the patient, and (2) the patient did not personally seek
his assistance. 113 The court rejected these arguments for two reasons. 114
First, Indiana statutes defined malpractice as any tort or breach of con-
tract based on health care, and health care was defined as any act or
treatment performed by any health care provider."l 5 Second, the court
held that a patient need not personally seek a physician's assistance,
since a patient's consent for treatment can be implied when one person
contracts with another for the patient's benefit. 116 In a subsequent case,
Dodd-Anderson v. Stevens, 117 the court, discussing Walters, stated:
It would be contrary to common medical practice to find that a
pathologist whose everyday job is not merely to consult with
other physicians, but to make independent examinations of
tissue samples and render medical judgments thereon, cannot
be held responsible for medical negligence merely because the
patient from whom the sample was taken did not specifically
consult with the pathologist or otherwise formally enter into a
physician-patient relationship."i 8
Clearly, the courts will not allow a physician to avoid responsibility
for a missed diagnosis on the basis of never meeting or examining the
patient. A physician using telemedicine to interpret lab, pathology,
radiology, cardiology, and similar information should note that he or she
may be liable for mistakes in interpreting patient information, regardless
of the intervention of other providers or the lack of contact with the
patient.
109. Id.
110. 520 N.E.2d 468 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
111. Walters v. Rinker, 520 N.E.2d 648, 470 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 471.
114. Id. at 471-72.
115. Id. at 471.
116. Id. at 472.
117. 905 F. Supp. 937 (D. Kan. 1995).
118. Dodd-Anderson v. Stevens, 905 F. Supp. 937, 944 (D. Kan. 1995).
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C. ABANDONMENT CLAIMS: IS THE PRACTITIONER WHO USES
TELEMEDICINE AT RISK?
In order to prove breach of a physician's duty by abandonment, a
plaintiff must show: (1) unilateral severance of the physician-patient
relationship by the doctor; (2) severance occurred without reasonable
notice or without adequate provision of alternative medical care; and (3)
severance was at a time when there was a necessity for continuing
medical treatment. 11 9 As stated in Sparks v. Hicks,120 "those jurisdic-
tions that have considered the question [of patient abandonment] agree
that when further medical or surgical attention is needed, a physician
may terminate the physician-patient relationship only after giving reason-
able notice and affording an ample opportunity for the patient to secure
other medical attention from other physicians."121 Abandonment may
be avoided by providing the patient with an alternative source for medi-
cal treatment, such as referring the patient to another physician.t 22
To avoid a claim of abandonment, a physician offering advice via
telecommunications should establish a safety net checklist to ensure that
a patient will continue to have access to adequate medical care after the
telemedical evaluation concludes. For example, a physician treating or
diagnosing a patient via telemedicine should know (1) whether after the
consult concludes the patient will be receiving continued health care
supervision or treatment, (2) who will be providing the care, and (3) that
the patient has been provided with an emergency contact number if, after
considering factors (1) and (2), the distant physician is not comfortable
that the patient will have access to adequate medical care after the
conclusion of the telemedicine consult. It is unlikely that a physician
consulting via telecommunications would be found guilty of abandon-
ment while the local physician is involved in the patient's treatment;
however, as telemedicine increasingly reaches into the home it will
remain the responsibility of the physician to ensure that the patient
receives necessary treatment and that severance of the physician-patient
relationship is handled carefully when the patient needs continued care.
VI. WHERE DOES PROPER JURISDICTION REST IN A
TELEMEDICAL MALPRACTICE SUIT?
The use of telecommunications to deliver health care information
and services has raised a novel and significant issue regarding where the
119. See Smith v. Lerner, 387 N.W.2d 576, 579 (Iowa 1986); King v. Fisher, 918 S.W.2d 108,
112 (Tex. App. 1996).
120. 912 P.2d 331 (Okla. 1996).
121. Sparks v. Hicks, 912 P.2d 331, 333 (Okla. 1996).
122. King, 918 S.W.2d at 111.
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practice of medicine is occurring. Traditionally, a physician practiced
medicine within the boundaries of the state in which he or she was
licensed to practice. The physician might treat patients from other states,
but these patients traveled to the physician's state in order to receive
treatment. The use of the telephone to deliver professional advice to
distant patients heralded the dawn of a new era in jurisdictional ques-
tions. The courts were required to sift through conflicts of law, public
policy, and tort principles in order to determine where the proper forum
for a medical malpractice suit would lie.
It is a conflicts of law principle that jurisdiction will rest either where
the situs of the injury occurred or in the state which has the most ties to
the issues involved. Section 146 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws provides that in "an action for personal injury, the local law of
the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of
the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state
has a more significant relationship." Most states possess long-arm stat-
utes granting jurisdiction over persons committing a tort in that state. In
order to determine where the alleged malpractice occurred (and where
jurisdiction most probably lies), it must first be determined where the
practice of medicine took place.
The states have the power to regulate health care professionals in
order to protect the health and safety of state citizens. 123 In fact, every
state possesses a physician licensing act, as well as numerous statutes and
regulations dealing with providing health care services. Numerous other
health care providers are also licensed and regulated by the states, a
partial listing of which includes dentists, registered nurses, licensed
practical nurses, physical therapists, and psychologists. The practice of
medicine is generally defined among the states to include, at the least,
"any attempt to diagnose or treat a person for any mental or physical ill-
ness." 124 According to this broad definition, diagnosis or treatment via
telecommunications may be considered to take place in the patient's
locale. 125 Courts have generally held this to be true, largely in part
because the regulation of health care providers by a state is to protect
citizen welfare. 126 According to a number of cases concerning the inter-
state practice of medicine, citizens who receive medical attention in their
own states, regardless of the medium used to provide that care, presume
123. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving powers to the states which are not explicitly granted to
the federal government).
124. Phyllis F. Granade, Implementing Telemedicine on a National Basis - A Legal Analysis of the
Licensure Issues, 83 FED'N BULL. J. MED. LICENSURE & DISCIPLINE 7, 10 (1996) (discussing whether the
telemedicine practitioner is practicing medicine where he or she is personally located or where the
patient is located).
125. Id.
126. Id. This is based on the Supreme Court's ruling in Geiger v. Jenkins, 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
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that they may avail themselves of the remedies available pursuant to the
laws of their state.
Since the practice of medicine is regulated by each state in order to
protect state citizens, it stands to reason that out-of-state physicians prac-
ticing in the state via telemedicine may be required to abide by its laws
and regulations, and may be subject to its jurisdiction. However, it also
stands to reason that the very laws which exist to protect the health and
safety of state citizens should not prevent citizens from accessing the
care they need, regardless of where the provider may be located. In fact,
a majority of states have statutes which allow locally licensed physicians
to request consultations from out-of-state physicians. 127
Case law involving malpractice jurisdictional issues indicates that the
point of service is in the patient's location. 128 One of the key cases on
the subject is Wright v. Yackley, 129 a medical malpractice action by an
Idaho citizen against a South Dakota doctor. 130 The Idaho citizen had
originally been treated in South Dakota, and upon moving to Idaho
called the South Dakota physician to request that a copy of an existing
prescription be mailed across the state line. 131 The Idaho citizen then
sued for injuries incurred while taking the drug. 132 The court found that
no tort was committed within the state of Idaho sufficient to establish
jurisdiction over the South Dakota physician.133 The court stated that
"if the appellee was guilty of malpractice, it was through acts of diagno-
sis and prescription performed in South Dakota. The mailing of the
[existing] prescriptions to Idaho did not constitute [a] new prescription.
It was simply confirmation of an old diagnosis and prescription."134
The due process determination might have been different "if the doctor
could be said to have treated an out-of-state patient by mail or to have
provided a new prescription or diagnosis in such fashion."1 35 This
implies that even the diagnosis or treatment of a patient by mail might
subject the physician to the jurisdiction of the patient's state.
127. Id. at 10. It should be noted that only half of the states possess statutes which would allow a
telemedical consultant to enter the state on more than an irregular basis.
128. See Wright v. Yackley, 459 F.2d 287, 289 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that in cases involving
personal services the focus is on where the service is rendered); McGee v. Riekhof, 442 F. Supp.
1276, 1278 n.1 (D. Mont. 1978) (holding that personal services cases involve a focus on where the
service is performed); Presbyterian Univ. Hosp. v. Wilson, 654 A.2d 1324, 1335 (Md. 1995) (finding
that a provider's actions in bringing patients from their state to the provider established jurisdiction in
the patients home state); Simmons v. State of Montana, 670 P.2d 1372, 1385 (Mont. 1983) (finding that
a medical testing facility serving a region does not establish jurisdiction in states where the patient hails
from).
129. 459 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1972).
130. Wright, 459 F.2d at 288.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 288-89.
135. Id. at 289 n.4.
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The rule as set forth in Wright concerning the location of the point
of service is stated as follows:
In the case of personal services focus must be on the place
where the services are rendered, since this is the place of the
receiver's (here the patient's) need. This need is personal and
the services rendered are in response to the dimensions of that
personal need. They are directed to no place but to the needy
person herself. 136
However, the court did go on to recognize that the forum state's
natural interest in protecting its citizens can be countered by an interest
in their access to medical services whenever needed.137 Unfortunately,
the court interprets this access to services interest to simply mean the
citizen's right to procure medical care in distant states while traveling or
living there. 138 The court felt that a physician who through "systemic or
continuing effort" provided services to a distant state would be subject
to that state's jurisdiction.139
Interestingly, the Mississippi Attorney General's office published an
opinion in December of 1995 stating that radiologists located outside of
Mississippi are not practicing medicine in Mississippi when they interpret
radiographic images received from that state. 140 According to the opin-
ion, the practice of medicine in Mississippi is defined such that radiolo-
gists interpret the images where they, not the patients, are located.141
However, the same opinion found that "where an out-of-state physician
provides orders, outside the State of Mississippi, to be administered by a
nurse in the State of Mississippi, the physician is 'practicing medicine'
in the State." 142
This opinion lends credence to the argument that teleradiology,
telepathology, and other non-interactive uses of telemedicine may occur
where the physician, and not the patient, is located. After all, the
teleradiologist interprets the image only after he or she receives the
image where he or she is located. However, this result might be different
if an interactive consultation occurred; for example, if a radiologist
reviewed a real-time (live) ultrasound of a patient from a distant state.
Additionally, and as mentioned in the discussion of Dougherty v.
Gifford, it is highly likely that a court would find that a physician-patient
relationship existed sufficient to bring a malpractice suit against a
136. Id. at 289.
137. Id. at 290.
138. Id. at 291.
139. Id. at 290.
140. Miss. Op. Att'y Gen. (Dec. 8, 1995), available in 1995 WL 779738.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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teleradiologist. A teleradiologist could be held liable for an incorrect
interpretation, but could argue that jurisdiction would remain in his or
her state.
A physician treating or diagnosing patients via telemedicine must be
aware that the patient's state is not the only location in which suit may be
brought. The physician's state would have sufficient ties through its
licensure and regulation of the physician to be chosen as a suitable
forum by the plaintiff. Additionally, telemedicine is rapidly becoming a
multi-state business. The establishment of business sites in multiple
states could open a telemedical venture to suit in any jurisdiction where it
possesses sufficient business contacts. If a medical malpractice action
met the diversity of citizenship requirements, a plaintiff could also
choose to bring suit in federal court. The plaintiff in a medical malprac-
tice case involving interstate telemedicine may have the opportunity to
forum shop, and pick the jurisdiction in which he or she is most likely to
win. One unfortunate result of forum shopping by the plaintiff would
be the avoidance of states possessing statutory caps on medical malprac-
tice liability.
VII. INTERSTATE PRACTICE-WILL A FAILURE TO POSSESS A
LICENSE IN A DISTANT STATE AFFECT THE DETERMINA-
TION OF NEGLIGENCE?
One concern among providers is whether the failure to possess a
separate license to practice in each jurisdiction contacted via telemedi-
cine might lead to additional malpractice liability. Since 1993, at least
ten states have passed legislation or regulations requiring out-of-state
physicians to obtain licensure in that state before providing medical
services via telemedicine. 143 Clearly, the states are concerned about the
growing ease with which providers are practicing across crossing state
lines. The Attorney General in a very protective state might choose to
prosecute physicians violating the licensure requirement, and it is possi-
ble that a physician's "home state" licensing board could discipline the
physician for actions in another state. For purposes of medical malprac-
tice liability, however, the question is whether the lack of licensure can be
construed as evidence of negligence (i.e., the physician was not licensed
to practice in this state, therefore was not qualified to perform the
diagnosis or treatment). Some jurisdictions have determined that failure
to have a license to practice does not authorize the inference of negli-
gence.144 In fact, the court in Andrews v. Lofton 145 stated "[a] breach of
143. Granade, supra note 124, at 15. As of June 1, 1997, these states are Arizona, Connecticut,
Georgia, Indiana, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Texas.
144. See Irwin v. Arrendale, 159 S.E.2d 719, 725 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967) (noting that not having a
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duty to the state does not necessarily involve a breach of duty to an
individual."146 However, in some jurisdictions the lack of a license in
that particular state might be considered evidence of negligence.
VIII. THE PROVIDER'S POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR
EQUIPMENT FAILURE
The physician using telemedical equipment, and the hospital or
clinic furnishing such equipment, may find themselves sued for the
equipment's failure or malfunction if it causes injury to a patient.147 A
physician is responsible for any harm to a patient caused by his or her
lack of knowledge or skill, or the failure to use reasonable care and
diligence while using any equipment for treating a patient.148 If a
physician or other provider does not know how to correctly use the
equipment and a patient is physically harmed, or a diagnosis is missed,
liability may result. 149 Additionally, the hospital or clinic providing the
equipment is required to maintain the equipment so that it is reasonably
fit for the purposes to which it will be put.150 A hospital or clinic may be
liable for furnishing defective equipment if the organization was negli-
gent in its care or upkeep.
One issue raised by telemedicine is the degree of responsibility an
individual practitioner has for determining whether the equipment is
working correctly and is adequate to perform its intended function (in
other words, whether the equipment's performance is sufficient for the
physician to make a correct diagnosis). The general rule is that the
prictitioner should inspect the equipment for patent, or obvious, defects
and may be liable for an injury caused by a defect which the physician
should have noticed.151 However, where the defect is not obvious to the
physician, the court may determine that the hospital, and not the physi-
cian, is liable for the injury caused. 152 In Berg v. United States,15 3 the
court held that the hospital failed to maintain its equipment properly and
that its technologists were not adequately familiar with the equipment,
therefore the hospital was liable for the patient's stroke caused by the
license is a breach of duty to the individual, therefore absence of a license does not authorize an
inference of negligence); Andrews v. Lofton, 57 S.E.2d 338, 342-43 (Ga. Ct. App. 1950) (holding that
the mere failure to have a license to practice medicine will not authorize an inference of negligence).
145. 57 S.E.2d 338 (Ga. Ct. App. 1950).
146. Andrews, 57 S.E.2d at 342.
147. See W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Hospital's Liability to Patient for Injury Sustained From
Defective Equipment Furnished by Hospital for Use in Diagnosis or Treatment of Patient, 14 A.L.R.3d
1254, 1256-58 (1967).
148. Id. at 1256.
149. Id. at 1257.
150. Id. at 1256.
151. Id. at 1257.
152. Id.
153. 806 F.2d 978 (10th Cir. 1986).
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hospital's attempted cerebral angiogram. 154 The general rule for equip-
ment failure is that the provider or hospital may be liable for negligence
in the care, maintenance, or use of the equipment, but will not be liable
for latent defects which cause harm to a patient. 155 However, the manu-
facturers and sellers of such equipment may find themselves liable under
the theory of strict liability.
Plaintiffs who are injured by telemedical equipment which is
defective and unreasonably dangerous might sue the manufacturers and
sellers of the equipment under the rule of strict liability in tort. Pursuant
to the theory of strict liability, manufacturers and sellers of defective and
unreasonably dangerous products are liable, without proof of negligence
or other fault, for injuries to the user or consumer caused .by such
products.156 This rule applies even if the seller has used all possible care
in developing its product, and even if the person harmed by the equip-
ment is not the person who originally purchased the equipment. The
justification for this rule is that manufacturers and sellers are responsible
to the public which might be injured by the equipment, and that the
manufacturers and sellers are in the best position to bear the cost of
liability insurance. 157
Hospitals and practitioners, in general, are not subject to strict
liability claims, since they are not engaged in the business of selling or
supplying products but instead provide professional services. 158 Health
care providers are typically considered users of the equipment, and not
suppliers subject to strict liability. In Silverhart v. Mt. Zion Hospital,159 a
patient was injured when a surgical needle broke and became lodged in
her pelvic area. 160 The plaintiff contended that the hospital was strictly
liable if the needle was defective, and the court responded that the
process of manufacturing and distribution ended with the entity supply-
ing the defective needle to the hospital, and at that point the needle
became part of the surgical equipment of the hospital.161 The court
concluded that a hospital furnishing a surgical needle as part of the
medical services it provides was not a seller for strict liability purposes,
but was instead a consumer of the needle.1 62 As a consumer of the
154. Berg v. United States, 806 F.2d 978, 982 (10th Cir. 1986).
155. See, e.g., id.
156. See Marc L. Carmichael, Annotation, Liability of Hospital or Medical Practitioner Under
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157. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
158. Carmichael, supra note 156, at 261.
159. 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Ct. App. 1971).
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161. Id. at 190-91.
162. Id. at 191.
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defective equipment, the court reasoned that the liability of the hospital
would depend on whether it was negligent in its use.163
All health care providers who use telemedicine to deliver health care
information or services should be adequately trained in the use of the
equipment. Providers should be able to identify patent defects and
malfunctions in the equipment which might affect the diagnosis or
treatment of the patient. Although it is unlikely that a provider, whether
a physician or a hospital, will be found strictly liable for telemedical
equipment containing a latent defect which causes an injury to a patient,
the provider should be aware that liability for negligent use of the
equipment remains a possibility.
IX. CONCLUSION
Telemedicine facilitates and encourages practitioners in rural and
urban locations to contact each other and thereby increase their profes-
sional knowledge and skill. The Internet provides access to up-to-date
reference materials concerning diagnosis, treatment, and pharmacology
for all practitioners. Telecommunications technology simplifies the
transfer of all information, including continuing medical education and
health care reference materials, and should expedite movement toward a
national standard of care. Practitioners and patients alike will benefit
from the increased access to health care services and information deliv-
ered via telecommunications, and it is possible that medical malpractice
may decrease due to increased patient access to specialists. Telemedicine
also allows earlier intervention in patient illness and may prevent serious
or recurrent problems. Because it increases competition among provid-
ers and increases access to medical care for patients, telecommunications
has become-and will continue to be-a valuable tool for delivering
health care information and services.
Medical malpractice issues and accompanying risk management
considerations are everyday concerns for most providers. Telecommu-
nications does not change the traditional legal concepts of the physician-
patient relationship, duty of care, standard of care, joint and several
liability, negligent supervision, or abandonment. In fact, medical mal-
practice cases involving the use of the telephone to deliver advice to
patients have existed since the invention of the telephone. Telemedicine
malpractice cases might be characterized as the application of old law to
new delivery mechanisms. However, the provider must remain aware of
those issues which are most applicable to telemedicine, such as: (1)
control over the patient's treatment or diagnosis; (2) division of liability
163. Id.
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between physicians for negligent actions; (3) negligent supervision; (4)
equipment failure; and (5) proper jurisdiction.
As telemedicine becomes more commonplace, the courts will
address each of these issues. Once guidelines for avoiding telemedical
malpractice exist, the use of telecommunications for health care
applications will increase dramatically. Malpractice issues, like taxes, are
inevitable, but with an awareness of the issues and an eye toward risk
management, the provider may recognize telemedicine as his or her
greatest ally in the evolving health care environment.

